




and the NAIRU 
in European Economies




























































































































































































EUI Working Paper RSC No. 97/50
Giorno/Deserres/Sturm: European Unemployment: 
Macroeconomic Aspects 




. 0 2 0 9 4  vfeF J(>



























































































The Robert Schuman Centre was set up by the High Council of the EUI in 
1993 to carry out disciplinary and interdisciplinary research in the areas of 
European integration and public policy in Europe. While developing its own 
research projects, the Centre works in close relation with the four departments 




























































































EUROPEAN UNIVERSITY INSTITUTE, FLORENCE
RO B ERT SCH UM AN CEN TR E
European Unemployment: Macroeconomic Aspects
Macroeconomic Policy and the NAIRU 
in European Economies





Paper presented at the Conference of the RSC on 
European Unemployment: Macroeconomic Aspects 
held at the EUI on 21-22 Nov. 1996, and organised by Michael Artis 
(in collaboration with the Economics Department and the European Forum) 
with financial support from the European Commission, DG V
EUI W orking Paper RSC No. 97/50 




























































































No part o f this paper may be reproduced in any form 
without permission o f the authors.
©C. Giom o, A. Deserres & P. Sturm 
Printed in Italy in Septem ber 1997 
European University Institute 
Badia Fiesolana 





























































































1. The dynamics of unemployment and inflation, as well as the interaction 
between these two variables, are viewed as key to understanding the impact and 
defining the role of macroeconomic policy. Since the early 1970s, it has 
generally been held that the unemployment rate can be conceptually 
decomposed into a structural component (the structural rate of unemployment, 
or SRU) and a business-cycle component. The SRU, like other "real" variables, 
is determined by structural and behavioural characteristics of the economy 
rather than by nominal (i.e. monetary) developments (Friedman, 1968)'. 
Moreover, an attempt to use aggregate demand management policy to hold the 
unemployment rate permanently below (above) the SRU would result in 
accelerating inflation (disinflation).
2. This latter characteristic led to use of the term "non-accelerating 
inflation rate of unemployment", or NAIRU, to describe the structural rate of 
unemployment. In this view, inflation dynamics are governed by the gap 
between the NAIRU and the actual unemployment rate: reducing the 
unemployment rate below the NAIRU, for example, will increase the inflation 
rate. In this sense, there is a trade-off between inflation and unemployment; but 
this trade-off is not permanent - the unemployment gap will eventually close 
and the final outcome will be the same unemployment rate (the NAIRU, which 
depends only on real variables, not on inflation) at a higher inflation rate, 
i.e., there is no long-run inflation-unemployment trade-off.
3. Both theoretical considerations and empirical research suggest that wage 
and price inflation depend not only on the gap between the unemployment rate 
and the NAIRU but also on the change in the gap. In this case, a distinction 
arises between the SRU and the NAIRU (see Box: "Distinction between the 
SRU and the NAIRU"). While the former still depends only on structural 
factors, the NAIRU has dynamics of its own and will, therefore, deviate 
temporarily from the SRU in response to both structural and aggregate demand 
shocks. One implication is that inflation will continue to rise if the actual 
unemployment rate is below the NAIRU, even if it is above the SRU. Aggregate
1. Macroeconomic policies may have some effect on the SRU by increasing certainty about the 
future and reducing economic variability, thereby reducing the amount of frictional 
unemployment. In addition, fiscal policy measures can have structural implications (for example 
non-neutral tax increases) which may also affect the SRU. However, policy-induced purely 



























































































demand management policies to reduce unemployment to the SRU must, 
therefore, take care not to outrun the dynamics of the NAIRU, an observation 
that has led to the term "speed-limit effects" to describe the slow return of the 
NAIRU to the SRU following a shock.
4. Virtually all OECD countries implicitly or explicitly use the NAIRU 
framework as a general reference in setting and discussing their policies. As a 
quantitative indicator, the measured NAIRU or SRU provide a direct gauge of 
the extent of labour-market imperfections and, thus, the scope for structural 
policies. However, the role of these indicators play in practice in 
macroeconomic analysis and macro-policy setting appears to differ across 
countries. In general, this role seems to be more limited in Europe, especially 





























































































Distinction between the SRU and the NAIRU
1. The conceptual distinction between the NAIRU and the SRU can be illustrated in a simple fashion using an 
inflation equation that can be thought of as a version of the Phillips curve.
Dp = Dp.i - bl(U-SRU) - b2DU + z [1]
In this equation, p is the logarithm of the aggregate price level, U is the unemployment rate, z captures various factors 
that could influence inflation independently from the degree of tightness prevailing in the labour market;
DU = U - U.i is the change in the unemployment rate and Dp = p - p_, represents inflation.
2. The SRU, or Structural Rate of Unemployment, is essentially determined by structural factors and is 
considered as being independent of the cyclical influence of aggregate demand fluctuations. However, for various 
reasons, the unemployment rate consistent with stable inflation, or NAIRU, may deviate temporarily from the SRU 
when labour markets are affected by structural or macroeconomic shocks.
3. In the context of equation [1], this possibility is introduced by adding the change in the unemployment rate 
(DU) on the right-hand side of the equation which permits a derivation of the NAIRU. Defining the NAIRU as the 
unemployment rate consistent with stable inflation (i.e. assuming z = 0 and Dp = Dp.i), one obtains the following 
relationship between the NAIRU, the SRU and last period's observed unemployment rate:
NAIRU = (bl/(bl+b2))*SRU + (b2/(b 1+b2))*U., [2]
4. The more sensitive the NAIRU is to purely cyclical factors (i.e. the bigger the size of b2 relative to bl), the 
wider the divergence between the NAIRU and the SRU will be (for a given divergence between the observed 
unemployment rate and the SRU) and the longer this divergence can be expected to prevail. This phenomenon is 
commonly referred to as the "speed-limit" effect.
5. In an extreme case, the speed-limit effect becomes an hysteresis effect if the level of unemployment exerts 
no influence on inflation which then depends only on the change in unemployment (bl = 0). In this hypothetical 
situation, the NAIRU being entirely determined by cyclical factors (captured by the lagged observed unemployment 




























































































5. Monetary authorities in the United States refer to the NAIRU or the 
SRU estimate with explicit recognition of speed-limit effects when discussing 
the required stance of monetary policy, while monetary authorities in most 
European countries appear more reluctant to refer to any specific estimate of the 
NAIRU. Moreover, while in countries adhering to the Maastricht treaty fiscal 
targets are set as ratios of actual GDP, several other countries including 
Australia and Norway discuss the appropriateness of their fiscal policy in terms 
of cyclically-adjusted budget balances. Utilisation of macroeconomic policies 
appears also to differ between European countries with fixed exchange rates 
and a number of other OECD countries when they are in a similar phase of the 
cycle. For example, countries like the United States, Japan and Norway tend to 
respond much more aggressively than Germany or France whenever a labour 
market gap opens up, in an effort to stabilise the real economy. In addition, 
some countries (e.g. Germany, Switzerland) seem much more determined than 
others to prevent situations of excess demand by tightening monetary policy 
immediately and aggressively as soon as there are any indications of a pick-up 
in inflationary pressures or inflation expectations, even in situations of 
relatively high unemployment.
6. This paper aims at discussing the reasons for these difference across 
countries, and especially what characterises the European economies compared 
with other economies, as regards the utilisation of the NAIRU indicator for the 
formulation of macro-policies (part II) and the utilisation of macro-policies for 
addressing their unemployment problem (part III). The conclusions of this 
analysis are presented in part IV of this paper.
II. The use of the NAIRU for the conduct of macro-policy
7. There are a number of possible reasons which help to explain why, 
despite principal agreement on the general analytical framework, certain 
countries appear more readily than others to use quantitative estimates of the 
NAIRU for the formulation of their macro-policy. These reasons can be traced 
to perceived differences in the precision of actual NAIRU estimates and the 
closeness of the unemployment gap-inflation link. These issues are now 
explored in more detail.
Measurement issues
8. The NAIRU is not directly observable. To make the concept operational, 
it has to be quantified. Numerous methods of estimating this structural 
unemployment rate have, therefore, been developed. Usually based on an 




























































































wage trends, company margins or the unemployment rate, they can be divided 
broadly into two main categories. The first group of so-called “structural 
methods” involves modelling wage and price determination mechanisms at an 
aggregate level, on the basis of economic agents’ behaviour. The NAIRU is 
then derived from these estimated equations, assuming that markets are in 
equilibrium2. The second group of “direct methods” postulates the existence of 
a NAIRU but does not try to specify or identify the underlying behaviour of 
economic agents. The NAIRU is, in such a case, derived from its supposed 
effects, based on observation of unemployment and/or inflation, by 
decomposing the unemployment series into a trend (NAIRU) component and a 
residual.
9. As a general rule, the NAIRU is a concept that is difficult to measure 
precisely for all countries, irrespective of the measurement method chosen. 
Point estimates vary greatly and are subject to a large margin of uncertainty3. 
Even in the United States, for which NAIRU estimates are thought to be 
relatively precise, Staiger etal. (1996), for example, have put the 95 per cent 
confidence interval at plus or minus 1.3 percentage points, using direct 
measurement methods. Some estimated confidence intervals for NAIRUs in 
European economies using structural measures tend to be so large that they 
cover the whole historical range of observed unemployment rates, leading the 
European Commission (1995) to seriously question the NAIRU as a useful 
policy indicator in practice4. Several recent studies come to similar conclusions 
for the Netherlands (van der Horst et al., 1996), Finland (Holm and 
Somervudrie, 1996), Austria (Pichelmann, 1996) and the United Kingdom 
(Melliss and Webb, 1996), even if in this latter case this point is made point 
more cautiously.
2. Actually, the concepts of NAIRU and equilibrium unemployment rate of the labour market 
need not to be stricto sensu equivalent. The equilibrium unemployment rate can be defined as 
the unemployment rate consistent with no inflation surprise (i.e. inflation expectations fulfilled); 
but the absence of inflation surprises does not necessarily correspond to stable inflation as this 
correspondence depends on the expectation formation mechanism. In the long run, however, 
these notions are likely to be equivalent as, with monetary policy aiming at maintaining a low 
and stable inflation rate, a prolonged period of absence of inflation surprises will finally mean 
that inflation stabilises (and vice versa).
3. As a general rule "direct" NAIRU measures tend to give more precise results, since they 
typically involve less estimated parameters than structural methods. On the other hand, some 
direct estimation results (e.g. those based on filtering methods) do not permit an objective 
evaluation of their precision (i.e. the computation of confidence intervals); and only structural 
measures provide information on NAIRU determinants.
4. The extremely large confidence intervals of NAIRU estimates in the Commission paper 
appear to be over-estimates (at least partly) due to the mechanical calculation of confidence 




























































































10. Given the size of the measurement uncertainties determined by these 
technical analyses, it appears legitimate to wonder if the NAIRU indicator can 
be of any practical use for macro-policy conduct in any OECD country. In fact, 
the large confidence intervals computed for statistical NAIRU estimates mainly 
underscore the fact that when it comes to policy making, the use of 
econometrics without judgement is limited. In practice, economic decision 
making always occurs in an environment of uncertainty, and the influence of 
this uncertainty on decision making is a complicated matter. It depends in 
particular on the costs of inflation relative to the cost of unemployment, on the 
adjustment costs towards the targets fixed by authorities, and on the interaction 
between the policy decisions and the information about the level and the 
evolution over time of the NAIRU that can be inferred from their results5. In 
this context, the selection of a 95 per cent confidence interval is likely to be 
excessively ambitious. In virtually no country would the authorities seriously 
believe that the NAIRU is actually close to either the lower or the upper bound 
corresponding to typical estimates of the 95 per cent confidence interval6. 
Estimated with a 68 per cent confidence interval, the uncertainty surrounding 
the NAIRU in Staiger etal. (1996) would be reduced to about plus or minus 
0.6 percentage points. In addition, the appraisal of the quantitative importance 
of this precision problem may also vary according to studies. A recent European 
Commission analysis (1996), based on direct measurement methods, put the 
95 per cent confidence interval of the NAIRU for the United States at plus or 
minus 0.6 percentage points, significantly less than estimated by Staiger et al. 
(1996).
11. Nevertheless, available empirical studies suggest that a quite important 
difference exists in terms of precision of the NAIRU estimates between the 
United States and the European countries, independently of the method used 
(European Commission, 1996) 7. An explanation of this phenomenon is
5. A discussion of this question is provided in Braun and Chen (1996).
6. This scepticism is also justified by the limits of a reduced-form econometric approach to 
measure the NAIRU. The instability in the inflation-unemployment link on which direct NAIRU 
estimates are based may, to a large extent, be due to the volatility of inflation expectations. 
Imposing a fixed lag and coefficient structure on lagged inflation terms assumes a constant 
expectation formation process, and the actual volatility in this process may then "show up" in 
other parts of the estimation equation, translating into large confidence intervals for the NAIRU 
estimate. If this is the case, other direct estimation methods (like the OECD NAWRU estimates, 
described in Giomo e ta l. (1995)), which do not rely on regression analysis, may well be a 
preferable estimation method , even though it is impossible to compute a confidence interval for 
the resulting estimates.
7. According to the European Commission study, the 95 per cent confidence interval obtained 
with a direct estimation approach would be of plus or minus 0.6 per cent for the United States, 
while it would reach plus or minus 2.2 and 3.1 per cent respectively for the United Kingdom and 




























































































provided by Staiger etal. (1996) who show that the variance of NAIRU 
estimates tends to be the larger the stronger the trend increase in the NAIRU. This 
trend increase is a distinct feature of many European countries, contrary to what 
can be observed for the United States (Table 1). In other words, it appears that the 
characteristics of the functioning of the European labour markets, which explain 
in large part the trend increase of the Na IRU over the last 20 years (see below), 
are also at least partly the source of the measurement problem of this indicator.
12. Another serious problem attached to NAIRU estimates as an indicator 
for macro-policies is that they are necessarily backward-looking (based on 
historical data), while for the conduct of these policies one would ideally want 
to know what the NAIRU will be in the future. This point is particularly 
relevant for a number of European countries, like the United Kingdom, Italy and 
Denmark, who have introduced important structural reforms of their labour 
markets: by how much will the structural unemployment rate and the NAIRU be 
affected by individual structural reform measures and how long does it take for 
these reforms to translate into a lower structural rate? These difficulties, too, 
explain in part the limitations affecting the usefulness of the NAIRU indicator 
for the formulation of macro-policy in a number of countries.
13. Obviously, the less precise a NAIRU estimate is, the less useful it will 
be in policy formulation and the less policy-makers will be willing to rely on it. 
In particular, any imprecision in NAIRU estimates will translate into imprecise 
measures of the output gap where the latter uses the NAIRU as an input, and 
this imprecision will also affect cyclical adjustments, for example of budget 
balances, based on such gap estimates8. This is likely to explain partly why 
many countries, especially European, are reluctant to use structural fiscal 
indicators in order to assess their public finance positions and to define their 
fiscal targets. Especially given that even if the NAIRU could be measured 
precisely, a question remains whether the appropriate cyclical adjustment of 
fiscal balance should be based on the NAIRU or the SRU9.
14. Concerning monetary policy management, the measurement problem 
appears, however, less crucial in various respects. Indeed, the NAIRU is not
8. However, this does not necessarily imply that the estimation of output gaps should not 
make use of the NAIRU unless it can be shown that alternative output gap measures are more 
precise than those using the NAIRU; the relevant choice criterion is relative, rather than 
absolute, precision; but the uncertainty surrounding such estimates should be taken into 
account when basing important policy decisions on them.
9. The cyclically-adjusted budget balances computed by the Secretariat are based on output 





























































































used as a "policy threshold" which, when reached, leads to an abrupt change in 
the policy setting. Lags between policy decisions and when specific policy 
measures actually affect the economy render such an approach inappropriate. 
This explains why, in practice, it is not so much the level of unemployment in 
relation to the NAIRU (whatever its estimated level) which determines policy 
action but the change in output indicators and unemployment. These monthly 
numbers convey information on the pace at which the economy is expanding. If 
this pace is considered unsustainable, implying an eventual collision with the 
potential output and/or NAIRU thresholds, monetary policy is adjusted to avoid 
overshooting and achieve a "soft landing". Periodic information on inflation and 
output - in fact all conjunctural data - are interpreted and acted upon in much 
the same fashion10.
Instability o f the inflation-unemployment link
15. If the use of the NAIRU indicator for monetary policy does not appear 
to be excessively dependant on the precision of estimates, it must, however, 
take into account of the degree of stability and of the closeness of the inflation- 
unemployment link. Yet, the comparison of developments in the rates of 
inflation and unemployment - the key relationship used for the "direct" 
measurement of the NAIRU - shows that the link between inflation and the 
labour-market gap is not stable in the short term. Figure 1 illustrates this 
instability for the G7 countries by juxtaposing changes in half-yearly inflation 
data and the labour market gap as estimated by the OECD. As Figure 2 
documents, the closeness of this link (as measured by the correlation 
coefficient) differs greatly between countries, being relatively high for the 
United States (-0.46) and relatively low in European countries and in Japan 
(-0.12), and even “wrongly” signed in the case of Italy.
16. There are several reasons which may generally explain the apparent 
weakness of this link between the change in inflation and the labour market
gap:
-  the labour market gap is not well measured (due to the difficulties of 
measuring the NAIRU);
10. This is consistent with the view expressed by FRB Governor L. B. Lindsey (1996) on how 
monetary policy operates. Similarly, Staiger etal. (1996) de-emphasise the importance of 
unemployment levels (and thus the unemployment gap) in deciding monetary policy actions. 
They argue in fact that "... a rule in which monetary policy responds not to the level of the 
unemployment rate but to recent changes in unemployment without references to the NAIRU 
(and perhaps to a measure o f the deviation of inflation from a target rate of inflation) is immune 




























































































-  inflation is not well measured'1;
-  the lag structure of the relationship between the labour market gap and the 
changes in inflation is likely to be variable over time. This reflects that the 
relationship depends on a number of determinants which can be rather 
volatile. These determinants include:
-  the credibility of government policies and the expectation formation 
mechanism of private agents;
-  the type of shocks to labour and goods markets hitting the economy;
-  the degree of nominal and real rigidities prevailing in these markets;
In addition, in an open economy in which much of the domestic price level is 
influenced by international competitiveness and world market prices, inflationary 
pressure is likely to show up, at least partly, in falling profit margins and a 
deteriorating current balance rather than in actual inflation.
17. The large degree of openness of the economy, which typically 
characterises European countries, is likely to explain, at least partly, why a 
weaker link exists between the cyclical fluctuations observed in the labour 
market and the changes in inflation in Europe than in the United States. 
However, the strength (or the weakness) of this link results also from the 
functioning of the labour markets in the respective countries and in particular 
from the stringency of regulations (and socio-cultural behaviour, like in Japan) 
affecting the degree of nominal and real rigidities in these markets, and thus the 
employment adjustment costs. This is implicitly suggested by Figure 2 which 
shows that in European countries and in Japan, the correlation coefficient 
between changes in inflation and estimated output gaps is much stronger than 
that between changes in inflation and estimated labour market gaps. Hence, the 
output gap appears to be on average a better indicator of the cycle than the 
labour market gap in European countries and Japan, contrary to the United 
States.
18. Overall, however, the volatility in the observed link between, on the one 
hand, inflation and, on the other, the estimated labour-market or output gap 
implies that estimated gaps are not a reliable predictor of whether inflation will 
rise or fall in the next period. Nevertheless, on average the link between 
unemployment gaps and inflation dynamics clearly holds, as witnessed by the 1
11. Because relative price changes can show up - temporarily at least - as changes in inflation, 




























































































distinct cyclical pattern of both inflation and unemployment. Indeed, the 
closeness of the link between inflation and these cycle indicators measured at 
yearly frequency is much stronger than at half-yearly intervals12; and since 
alternative indicators , such as the capacity-utilisation rate in the industrial 
sector also pose measurement and utilisation problems, the unemployment and 
output gap do provide (limited) information on underlying inflation pressure. 
Such information is valuable, in particular in situations where asymmetric 
inflation responses to labour-market imbalances greatly increase the cost of 
policy mistakes.
III. The use of macro-policy to reduce unemployment
19. Several reasons may help to explain why confronted with the same 
cyclical situation, macro-policies tend apparently to be used on average more 
cautiously in European countries than in other OECD areas, notably the United 
States. These reasons can be traced to perceived differences between countries 
in the asymmetries in response of inflation to positive and negative labour 
market or output gaps combined with differences in the trade-off between 
macro-policy objectives of countries. More fundamentally, they result from the 
limits and difficulties of using of macro-policies to solve the European 
unemployment problem which is essentially structural. The various structural 
rigidities which affect a number of European countries appear to explain not 
only the high level of the SRU but also the more-or-less stringent speed-limit 
effects or hysteresis, probably asymmetric, which characterise the functioning 
of labour markets in these economies. As a result, pertinent structural reform 
aiming at improving the adjustment capacity of the economies, and especially 
their labour markets, will be the most robust policies to solve the European 
unemployment problem, in particular to remove the structural impediments 
causing the effect of asymmetric hysteresis. In the shorter term, however, 
temporary increases in unemployment should also be minimised and not be 
allowed to persist because cyclical unemployment may become permanent.
Asymmetric inflation response
20. In order to formulate a macroeconomic policy which is consistent with 
the objective of keeping inflation low and stable it is necessary to accurately
12. The correlation coefficients between the changes in inflation and the estimated labour 
market gap reach -0.67 on the yearly data against -0.46 on the half-yearly data for the United 
States; -0.23 against -0.12 for Japan; -0.50 against -0.26 for Germany; -0.32 against -0.09 for 
France; -0.16 against 0.02 for Italy; -0.32 against -0.23 for the United Kingdom; and -0.50 
against -0.17 for Canada. Moreover, for the whole area constituted by the G7 countries this 




























































































assess the cyclical situation of the economy. This appears to be difficult in all 
countries and may be especially in European countries as suggested by the 
previous section13. Yet, if account is taken of the possible existence of 
asymmetries in the inflation/unemployment link and of induced costs in the 
event of an overheating economy, the authorities will be prompted to be more 
cautious in using macroeconomic policy. Indeed, if the inflation response to 
labour-market gaps is asymmetric, then a higher variance of unemployment will 
tend, all else equal, to raise inflation. Thus, the unemployment rate that is 
needed to stabilise inflation on average will rise with the variance of 
unemployment. In this case, reducing the size of economic fluctuations would 
result in a permanent output gain, although the size of this gain would depend 
on the degree of convexity of the Phillips curve14. There are at least two 
concrete macroeconomic-policy implications that flow from convexity. First, 
governments should do whatever they can to reduce business cycle fluctuations. 
Second, they should lean towards disinflation, since the penalty function - the 
eventual unemployment costs - is asymmetric: mistakes on the up-side are more 
costly than those on the down-side.
21. Work by the Secretariat and others has found evidence of such 
asymmetry for several Member countries (Laxton et al., 1994; Turner, 1995; 
Debelle and Laxton, 1996). The economic importance of this risk depends on 
the degree of asymmetry, which has proved difficult to measure with precision. 
According to Turner (1995), empirical evidences of asymmetric effects 
measured from the output gap can be found more clearly in the case of the 
United States, Japan and Canada than in the major European countries, even 
though some signs of such effects appear to be present in Germany and France 
but not in Italy and the United Kingdom15. Other work (see, for example, Braun 
and Chen, 1996) question, however, the existence of empirical evidence of 
asymmetries in the inflation/employment link and prefer to retain the
13. In general in Europe, the cyclical position of the economy cannot be identified as easily as in 
the United States from the cyclical fluctuations of unemployment. In addition, the changes in 
inflation appear to be a less reliable indicator of the cyclical situation in Europe than in the 
United States, this cyclical situation being estimated either by the output gap or by the 
unemployment gap (see the correlation coefficients reported in Figures 1 and 2). This difference 
between the two regions may partly be attributed to the larger degree of openness of European 
countries than the United States to international trade.
14. To illustrate the order of magnitude, Turner's (1995) estimates imply that if the variance of 
output were reduced from historical values to zero - clearly impossible from a policy 
perspective - output would be on average higher by about 1 per cent. By contrast, as Lucas 
(1987) pointed out, in the absence of nonlinearities, the welfare gains from output stabilisation 
alone are minute.
15. Debelle and Laxton (1996) find, however, evidence of asymmetric effects from the 





























































































assumption of a linear Phillips curve in the case of the United States, even if 
they found some evidence suggesting that this curve may be concave. Overall, 
differences in the appraisal of asymmetries, in combination with differences in 
policy objective functions, may well lead to very different policy responses to a 
given estimate of the labour-market gap in different countries.
Speed limit and hysteresis effects
22. While until the late-1980s, most of the empirical studies on the 
functioning of labour markets in the OECD countries concluded that there was 
no significant evidence of hysteresis16 and only infrequently discussed the 
importance and the causes of speed-limit effects, it is only in the last few years 
that empirical research has come to focus more on these questions. Many recent 
studies including those by Jackman etal. (1996), Ball (1996), Jaeger and 
Parkinson (1994), King etal. (1995), Karame (1996) and Scarpetta (1996) 
showed that there are indeed speed-limit effects to labour market adjustment in 
the majority of OECD countries. Countries seem, however, to be affected in 
varying degrees, the United States and Japan appearing, on the whole, to be less 
concerned than Canada or a good number of European countries such as 
Germany, Italy, the United Kingdom, Belgium or Spain. In the case of Norway, 
Holden (1996) notes that unemployment persistence effects are very strong 
because of the weakness of the mechanisms whereby the economy returns 
automatically to equilibrium17. Sometimes, the degree of unemployment 
persistence observed in certain countries seems so marked that the existence of 
hysteresis is a hypothesis that cannot be ruled out. For instance, using a direct 
statistical approach to measure underlying unemployment, Jaeger and Parkinson 
(1994) find signs of hysteresis in the case of Germany, the United Kingdom and 
Canada, but not for the United States18.
23. Table 2 reports some empirical results to shed light on the existence and 
importance of speed limit and/or hysteresis effects in the labour markets of the 
six major OECD countries, based on a “direct approach” where the changes in 
inflation are regressed on the level of the unemployment gap and the change in
16. A major exception being, o f course, the Blanchard and Summers study (1986) on 
European unemployment.
17. The notion of persistence as defined here covers both hysteresis mechanisms and strong 
speed-limit effect when combined with high sacrifice ratios. Both kinds of effects are likely to 
become observationally equivalent from the point of view of policy makers.
18. According to these authors’ estimates, a 1 point rise in the rate of cyclical unemployment 
results in a permanent 0.2 point increase in the unemployment rate. However, other empirical 
studies (e.g. Elmeskov, 1993 and Blanchflower and Oswald, 1995) suggest that the level of 
the unemployment gap (and not only changes in the gap) exerts some influence on the level of 




























































































the actual unemployment rate. These tests, on which more details are provided 
in the Annex, tend to confirm the results of empirical studies reported above, 
suggesting that speed-limit effects appear to be important in the labour markets 
of all countries reviewed here. In Germany, Italy, the United Kingdom and 
Japan, the persistence is such that it becomes very difficult to distinguish 
statistically between strong speed-limit effects and hysteresis given the limited 
size of the sample. These results seem relatively robust to various sensitivity 
tests. Finally, it appears that when we use output gaps (and the change in 
output) rather than labour-market gaps, the evidence of hysteresis and the 
importance of speed-limit effects is significantly diminished.
24. From a policy point of view, hysteresis implies that the NAIRU has no 
tendency to converge to a well-defined SRU (non-existent in a hysteresis world, 
see the box) but, rather, that equilibrium will be re-established by the NAIRU 
moving towards the actual rate of unemployment so that there can be a 
permanent trade-off between inflation and unemployment (Blanchard and 
Summers, 1986) 19. In this framework, the policy usefulness of the NAIRU 
concept is greatly reduced, or even disappears. Key policy concepts like the 
cyclically-adjusted budget deficit will become meaningless, complicating the 
discussion and appraisal of medium-term sustainability of fiscal policy and of 
the role of built-in stabilisers. However, if the permanent 
unemployment-inflation trade-off implied by hysteresis is symmetric, any policy 
mistake can be easily offset by reversing the policy action to return to the 
original situation. Likewise, the negative employment effects of adverse shocks 
can be offset by active demand management without causing a permanent 
acceleration of inflation.
Asymmetric hysteresis
25. If one retains as valid the assumption of (symmetric) hysteresis in 
certain European economies, the prudence characterising the use of macro­
policy in these countries may appear paradoxical given the unemployment 
problem they are facing. In fact, this cautious macroeconomic management can 
be more easily explained if one takes into account that the strong speed limit or 
even hysteresis effects apparently characterising the functioning of the labour 
market of these European countries are likely to be asymmetric: the NAIRU 
tends to rise with negative shocks but does not fall (or falls less) with positive 
shocks, especially those induced by macro-policy.
19. In practice, a NAIRU concept (but not a SRU) can be defined even when there is hysteresis. 
Thus, an alternative characterisation of the hysteresis view is that movements in the NAIRU 
reflect multiple labour-market equilibrium and that the NAIRU is, therefore, path dependent, 




























































































26. Three possible reasons for hysteresis have generally been identified in 
the literature: the existence of insider-outsider mechanisms, the existence of a 
deterioration of human capital of the unemployed and the existence of capacity 
constraints20. Yet, two of these underlying causes of hysteresis will tend to 
make hysteresis asymmetric21: in the case of insider-outsider mechanisms, 
where wages are set to stabilise employment at its current, post-shock, level and 
in the case where the human capital of workers who lose their jobs may 
deteriorate over time to the point where they become de facto unemployable, the 
business cycle will potentially have a ratchet effect on the NAIRU. Strong 
insider/outsider mechanisms may lead aggregate demand expansion induced by 
macro-policy to be reflected in wage increases rather than more employment 
when it is anticipated by agents; and the unemployed will not be able to take 
advantage of improved economic conditions if the decay in their human capital 
cannot be reversed quickly enough22. In both cases, the unemployed exert no 
effective downward pressure on wages, implying that expansion of aggregate 
demand will lead to an increase in inflation rather than employment.
27. The evolution of unemployment rates over time in many European 
countries is, in fact, reminiscent of such an asymmetric hysteresis phenomenon. 
Some empirical tests aimed at verifying the plausibility of this hypothesis for 
the six major OECD countries have then been carried out. For this purpose, two 
kind of tests have been performed aiming to distinguish two different operating 
regimes of the economy, depending on whether unemployment is rising or 
falling. The first test is based on the estimation of a simple Phillips-type 
reduced-form equation in which the positive and negative changes in 
unemployment have been introduced separately with their corresponding values 
of the unemployment gap; the second test aims at identifying the existence of 
asymmetries under the assumption of hysteresis, for those countries for which 
the hysteresis hypothesis cannot be rejected. In this case, the positive and 
negative changes in unemployment are separately introduced in the equation 
with no unemployment gap level effect (see the Annex for more details).
20. See Lindbeck and Snower (1984), Blanchard and Summers (1986) and Cross (1988).
21. According to the third cause, inflation is determined by capacity constraints, i.e. there is 
too little physical capital to achieve full employment at going wage rates due to earlier cyclical 
weakness of fixed investment and real wage stickiness and/or high real interest rates.
22. The assumption of asymmetric hysteresis resulting from a decay in human capital of the 
unemployed gives a quite convincing explanation of trend unemployment in Europe. This trend 
would result from the interaction of the long disinflation experienced during the eighties, which 
led to a rise in cyclical unemployment, with the long duration of unemployment payment 
benefits, which have given the jobless less incentive to seek employment and reduced their link 
to the labour market. In this case, it would be reasonable for policy-makers to prevent cyclical 




























































































28. The first test (Table 3) shows that in the case of France the inflation 
effect of the unemployment gap level is only significant when unemployment 
falls while only the change of unemployment appear to have a significant effect 
on inflation when unemployment rises. France is the only case among the six 
major countries for which this test detects such kind of asymmetric hysteresis: 
the hysteresis framework appears to be the more relevant framework when 
unemployment decreases whereas the NAIRU model fits better when 
unemployment falls. For the United States, contrary to France, it appears that 
the inflation effect of the unemployment gap is stronger when unemployment 
increases rather than when its falls23. For Germany, Italy, Japan and the United 
Kingdom, countries for which the hysteresis hypothesis had not been rejected 
by the initial tests (Table 2), introducing separately the episodes of rising or 
falling unemployment is inconclusive. For two of these countries, however, 
Germany and Italy, the test of asymmetry under the assumption of hysteresis 
(Table 4) shows that the inflation effect of a reduction in unemployment is 
stronger than the disinflation effect of a higher unemployment rate, which 
validates the expected asymmetric hysteresis property (even though it is 
different from the one observed for France). Overall, in three out of the four 
major European countries, empirical evidence tends to confirm the hypothesis 
of existence, in one form or the other, of asymmetric hysteresis even if one must 
remain cautious about the interpretation of these results24.
29. The permanent inflation-unemployment trade-off implied by 
unemployment hysteresis will be hard to exploit by systematic demand 
management policies if it is asymmetric, as is plausibly the case25. Therefore, in 
countries where labour-market adjustment appears to be particularly sluggish 
(e.g. France, Germany, Spain and most other European economies), it seems 
preferable to concentrate on structural reform aiming at increasing markets' 
capacity to adjust quickly to changing circumstances, rather than to focus on the
23. Such a result seems consistent with those reported in Braun and Chen (1996).
24. In the case of the United Kingdom and Japan it appears that one observes the inverse effect 
to those estimated for Germany and Italy. These results, apparently counter-intuitive in the case 
of the United Kingdom, must, however, be interpreted with care especially for this country 
where broad structural reforms of the labour market have been implemented over the last years. 
Moreover, given the limited size of the sample and the simple reduced-form equation used, the 
asymmetric effect detected depend only on a limited number of episodes. It could then be, for 
instance, the consequence of asymmetric shocks to which the economies have been submitted 
rather than asymmetry resulting from the functioning of the markets.
25. The kind of asymmetric hysteresis identified in the case of France appears more stringent 
than the one which might affect Germany or Italy. Indeed, in the case of France, the negative 
shocks tend to raise the NAIRU but the positive shocks do not lower it whereas in the case of 




























































































design of optimal macro-policies that take the degree of unemployment 
persistence as given and immutable.
Importance o f structural factors
30. As a rule, the studies agree on the importance of institutional and 
structural factors in explaining the inter-country variation in actual 
unemployment rates even though it is difficult to decide on the basis of formal 
empirical tests to what extent the highly-persistent changes in unemployment 
that have been observed in many OECD countries are primarily due to long- 
lasting speed-limit effects or to increases in the structural rate of 
unemployment26. According to Layard etal. (1991), Jackman etal. (1996), 
Scarpetta (1996) these structural variables can not only explain a substantial 
proportion of the inter-country differences in SRU levels but also cross country 
differences in labour market adjustment speeds. Key structural determinants that 
have been identified include: the duration and level (relative to market wages) 
of unemployment benefits; the strength of unions; the degree of centralisation 
of the wage-bargaining process on the employer side; job-protection legislation; 
taxes that drive a wedge between firms' labour costs and workers' pay; and some 
types of active labour market programmes.
31. It follows that the implementation of a range of structural reforms to 
labour and product markets constitutes the most promising approach to achieve 
sustainable reductions in unemployment under all the competing explanations 
for persistently high unemployment. The nature of the required policies is well 
known and they were laid out in the OECD Jobs Study and in the follow-up 
document, Implementing the Jobs Strategy. Such reforms must also be 
accompanied by macroeconomic policy that aims at fully utilising the scope for 
increased output (and thus employment) created by structural reform, while 
ensuring medium-term price stability.
26. In the latter case, it is difficult to clearly distinguish between changes in the SRU due to 
changes in its structural determinants and/or their interaction with a changing economic 
environment on the one hand, or to hysteresis effects on the other. There may be complex 
interactions between various structural changes that can obscure the effect on the NAIRU of 
any single one of them. Indeed, there may also be adverse interactions between unchanged 
structural factors and changes in the broader economic environment, like increased frequency 
and/or severity o f shocks (Ljungqvist and Sargent, 1996), the slowdown in productivity 




























































































The weakness o f self-equilibrating mechanisms
32. The importance of co-ordination of structural and macroeconomic 
policies to reduce unemployment in Europe should not be under-estimated if, as 
suggested by several recent studies, the mechanisms whereby the economy 
returns to equilibrium in the wake of cyclical labour market disequilibrium are 
weak. The convergence process of unemployment towards the NAIRU 
following a shock would be slowed by the existence of nominal and real 
rigidities in wage- and price-setting mechanisms. If this is the case, one should 
stress the importance of the recourse to active macroeconomic policy during 
cyclical downturn to prevent cyclical unemployment to transform into long-term 
unemployment leading finally to a worsening of already deep structural 
problems. A similar question exists for countries which have implemented 
structural adjustments of their labour markets: should macro-policy aim at 
exploiting the scope for increased output (the size of which is uncertain) or 
should policy makers rely on the (improved) self-adjustment mechanisms of the 
economy, thus reducing the risk of policy-induced inflationary pressures?
33. If it is likely that an excessively restrictive macro-policy may induce in 
the long run negative structural effect given the existing institutional rigidities 
affecting the functioning of markets, the recourse to macroeconomic policies 
also raises the question of the availability or the choice of instrument to be used 
(fiscal or monetary). In view of the state of public finances in virtually all 
OECD countries, fiscal policy is unlikely to be in the current circumstances, an 
appropriate instrument to stimulate the economy. Expansionary fiscal policies 
are likely to be ineffective as a means of reducing unemployment because of the 
crowding-out effects of interest rates or the exchange rate. This leaves monetary 
policy. That option is limited, however, for countries which have exchange-rate 
commitments and in such cases necessitates increased co-operation between 
countries. In certain countries (Norway, Italy), monetary policy can usefully be 
complemented by an income policy which co-ordinates agents’ inflationary 
expectations and thereby strengthens the mechanisms which restore economic 
equilibrium. This sort of policy is difficult to implement in many countries, 
however, because of the decentralised nature of wage bargaining.
IV. Conclusions
34. The NAIRU is a useful concept but its measurement is difficult since it 
cannot be directly observed. Margins of error attached to its estimates are 
substantial; they differ from country to country and across time. This fact limits 
the usefulness of the NAIRU for the purposes of macroeconomic policy, both 




























































































and to the instability of the inflation-unemployment link implies that this 
indicator has to be used with caution, especially in European countries where 
the NAIRU is not stable and where unemployment variations are not closely 
related to cyclical fluctuations of output, partly as the result of an insufficient 
flexibility of the labour markets. Estimates of the NAIRU should therefore be 
updated frequently to make sure they incorporate the latest information. For 
day-to-day policy decisions, however, the NAIRU will be only one among many 
relevant (although imperfect) indicators, complementing the information flow 
from actual labour market, inflation and output developments. Despite its 
shortcomings, the NAIRU may nevertheless play an important role in the design 
of a coherent macro-economic policy strategy and as an aid in communicating 
this strategy effectively.
35. The secular increase in NAIRUs in many European countries is 
unmistakable, however, and in this sense the NAIRU has proved useful as a 
guide to structural policy. An important point is that a number of structural 
factors appear to explain riot only the rise in the structural component of the 
NAIRU but also speed-limit effects and, where it may exist, hysteresis which 
seems to be asymmetric in a number of European countries. In all these cases, 
structural policies are essential to bring about a sustainable improvement of the 
employment situation.
36. On the other hand, macroeconomic policy can only play a limited role to 
reduce the existing unemployment problem in Europe, even though it may be 
useful in order to avoid its worsening. Monetary policy in particular should aim 
at reducing the size of economic fluctuations and err on the side of caution if 
signs of asymmetry can be detected. Indeed, policy errors leading to higher 
inflation could then be costly to correct. Moreover, despite the marked 
unemployment persistence effect which characterises a number of European 
countries, the apparent permanent inflation-unemployment trade-off implied by 
hysteresis will be hard to exploit by systematic demand management policies if 
they are asymmetric, as is plausibly the case. In this situation, the NAIRU rises 
with a negative shock but does not fall (or falls less) with a positive shock. The 
policy implications are that temporary increases in unemployment should be 
minimised and not be allowed to persist because cyclical unemployment may 
become permanent. In the longer run, structural reform is needed to remove the 





























































































BALL, Laurence (1996), Disinflation and the NAIRU, NBER Working Paper 
No. 5520, Cambridge, Mass.
BLANCHARD, O. and H. SUMMERS (1986), “Hysteresis in Unemployment”, 
European Economic Review, No. 31, p. 288-295.
BLANCHFLOWER, David and Andrew J. OSWALD (1995), “An Introduction 
to the Wage Curve”, Journal o f Economic Perspectives, Vol. 9, No. 3, p. 153- 
167.
BRAUN, S. and P. CHEN (1996), “The NAIRU as a Policy Target: 
Refinements, Problems and Challenges”, US contribution to the WP1 Meeting.
CROSS, R. (1988), Unemployment, Hysteresis and the Natural Rate 
Hypot!,esis, edited by R. Cross.
DEBELLE, G. and D. Laxton (1998), “Is the Phillips Curve Really a Curve? 
Some Evidence for Canada, the United Kingdom and the United States”, IMF 
Working Paper (September).
ELMESKOV, Jorgen (1993), “High and Persistent Unemployment - 
Assessment of the Problem and its Cause”, OECD Working Paper No. 132, 
(September).
EUROPEAN COMMISSION (1995), “The composition of unemployment from 
an Economic Perspective”, European Economy No. 59.
EUROPEAN COMMISSION (1996), “How Precisely Can the NAIRU Be 
Estimated?”, European Commission contribution to the WP1 Meeting.
FRIEDMAN, M. (1968), “The Role of Monetary Policy”, The American 
Economic Review, Vol. LVIII, No. 1, p. 1-17, March.
GIORNO, C„ P. RICHARDSON, D. ROSEVEARE and P. VAN DEN NOORD 
(1995), “Potential Output, Output Gaps and Structural Budget Balances”, 
OECD Economic Studies, No. 24, 1995/1.
HOLDEN, S. (1996), “The Unemployment Problem - a Norvegian Perspective”, 




























































































HOLM, P. and E. SOMERVUDRIE (1996), “Structural Unemployment in 
Finland”, Finland contribution to the WP1 Meeting.
JACKMAN, R., Richard LAYARD, Stephen NICKEL (1996) “Structural 
Aspects of OECD Unemployment”, Paper presented at the OECD Conference 
on Interaction Between Structural Reform, Macroeconomic Policies and 
Economic Performance, 18-19 January, Paris.
JAEGER, A. and M. PARKINSON (1994), “Some Evidence of Hysteria in 
Unemployment Rates”, European Economic Review, Vol. 38, No. 2 (February) 
pp. 329-342.
KARAME, F. (1996), “Estimation of the Natural Rate of Unemployment in 
Multivariate State-Space Representations with Different Second Measurement 
Equations”. Paper presented to the Applied Econometric Association 50th 
Congress in Goteborg, 9-10 May 1996.
KING, R.G., J.H. STOCK and M.W. WATSON (1995), “Temporal Instability 
of the Unemployment-Inflation Relationship”, Federal Reserve Bank of 
Chicago, Vol. XIX, Issue 3 (May/June) pp. 2-12.
LAXTON, Douglas, Guy MEREDITH and David ROSE (1994), “Asymmetric 
Effects of Economic Activity on Inflation: Evidence and Policy Implications”, 
IMF Working Paper, (November).
LAYARD, R„ S. NICKELL and R. JACKMAN (1991): “Unemployment - 
Macroeconomic Performance and the Labour Market”.
LINDBECK, A. and D.J. SNOWER, (1984), ‘The Insider-Outside Theory of 
Employment and Unemployment”, MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass.
LINDSEY, Lawrence B. (1996), “NAIRU Disrobed”, The International 
Economy, p. 8-13, March/April.
LJUNGQVIST, Lars and Thomas J. SARGENT (1996), “A supply-side 
explanation of European unemployment”, Economic Perspectives, Federal 
Reserve Bank of Chicago (September/October).
LUCAS, R.E. (1982), Model o f Business Cycles, Basil Blackwell.
MELLISS, C. and A.WEBB (1996), “The NAIRU: Concepts, Measurement and 




























































































OECD (1994), The OECD Jobs Study: Evidence and Explanation, Paris.
OECD (1995), The OECD Jobs Study: Implementing the Strategy, Paris.
OECD (1996), The OECD Jobs Strategy: Pushing ahead with the Strategy, 
Paris ---------"""
PICHELMANN, K. (1996), “The NAIRU - Concept: A Few Remarks”, Austria 
contribution to the WP1 Meeting.
SCARPETTA, Stefano (1996), “Assessing the Role of Labour Market Policies 
and Institutional Settings on Unemployment: A Cross-Country Study”, OECD 
Economic Studies (forthcoming).
STAIGER, Douglas, James H. STOCK, Mark W. WATSON (1996), “How 
Precise Are Estimates of the Natural Rate of Unemployment?”, NBER Working 
Paper, No. 5477.
TURNER, Dave, (1995), “Speed Limit and Asymmetric Inflation Effects from 
the Output Gap in the Major Seven Economies”, OECD Economic Studies, No. 
24, 1995/11.
VAN DER HORST, A., J. JACOBS and L. SCHOONBEEK (1996), “Is there a 



















































































































Figure 1 : Change in the Rate of Inflation vs the Level of the Unemployment Gap 
in the G7 OECD Countries (1)
(In percentage)
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I Based on semi-annual data going back in most cases to the mid-sixties. 
Inflation is calculated based on the GDP deflator and the unemployment 















































































































Figure 2 : Change in the Rate of Inflation vs the Level of the Output Gap 
in the G7 OECD Countries (1)
(in percentage)







Germany, corr=0.35 France, corr=0.15
Italy, corr=0.23 United Kingdom, corr=0.24
Canada, corr=0.22
I Based on semi-annual data going back in most cases to the mid-sixties. 
Inflation is calculated based on the GDP deflator and the output gap is 
the difference between the actual GDP and the OECD measure of potential 
GDP as a percentage of potential GDP (see Giomo et al.( 1995) for a 






























































































Table 1. Secretariat NAIRU/NAWRU^ estimates for selected OECD countries, 1970-95
1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995
United States 5.3 7.2 7.2 6.5 5.8 5.8
Japan 1.4 1.7 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.7
Germany 1.0 2.3 7.1 6.9 9.2
France 2.4 3.3 6.7 8.9 9.3 9.7
Italy 4.4 4.8 6.0 8.2 9.7 9.0
United Kingdom 2.4 4.0 7.4 10.2 8.4 7.2
Canada 5.1 6.8 8.5 8.7 9.0 8.7
Australia 1.9 4.1 6.4 7.9 8.3 7.7
Austria 1.2 2.0 3.8 4.9 5.4
Belgium 4.1 8.8 11.8 10.8 10.6
Denmark 1.1 4.3 7.6 8.6 9.6 10.4
Finland 2.4 4.4 5.5 5.5 8.0 14.9
Greece 1.7 1.7 3.2 6.4 7.0 8.0
Ireland 6.4 6.4 6.4 14.3 16.0 14.0
Netherlands 2.4 5.2 8.1 7.0 6.0
Norway 1.6 1.9 2.2 2.9 4.5 5.3
Spain 2.6 3.7 10.7 18.4 19.8 20.0
Sweden 1.7 1.7 1.9 2.2 3.2 6.5
Switzerland 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 1.3 3.0
1. The NAWRU is the unemployment rate which stabilises wage inflation, while the NAIRU is defined as the unemployment 




























































































Table 2. Test of hysteresis under the assumption of symmetry
Impact of the unemployment gap and the change in the unemployment rate on inflation 
(based on GDP deflator)'
United
States Japan Germany France
United
Kingdom Italy
Sample 61H1-95H2 63H1-94H2 64H1-95H2 65H1-94H2 63H2-94H2 63H2-95H2
A'P,, -0.317 -0.371 -0.644 -0.888 -0.195 -0.350
.................. ..........(3,1)....... ....... (5-2)............... (68).......... . 0,5)..... (2.9)
-0.328 -0.569 -0.498 -0.101 -0.271
..........(2,8)....... ....... (3-9)..... ..(3.0) (0.8) (2.3)
A!P„ -0.185 -0.461 -0.205 -0.254 -0.233
..........0  6)....... ....... (3-0)............... ...0,5) (2.1) (2.0)
A’P,, -0.400
....... (26)...............
A!P„, - - -0.226 - — —
....... (1.6)
A2P,, - - -0.299 — — —
(2.4)
UGAP -0.362 -2.40 -0.349 -0.832 -0.276 -0.023
...(?,0)........ ..........0 ,5 )....... ....... (1,2)............... (2.0) (1.0) (0.0)
At/,, -0.632 -7.05 -0.991 -1.63 -1.65 -3.19
...(?,8)........ ..........(2,2)....... ....... (1,2)............... ...0,5) (2.3) (2.7)
AC/,., 1.95
....... 0 ,8 )...............
AC/,., - - -2.39 - — —
....... (2,7)...............
ADJ-R2 0.21 0.20 0.33 0.44 0.11 0.15
S.E.E. 1.066 3.033 1.765 2.400 3.167 3.134
Wald test on the joint significance of lagged UGAP parameters
HO: UGAP coefficients are not significantly different from zero2.
P-value 0.000 0.014 0.014 0.028 0.034 0.032
Wald test on the significance of the sum of UGAP parameters
HO: sum of lagged UGAP coefficients is not significantly different from zero.
P-value 0.005 0.138 0.228 0.053 0.312 0.818
1. Except in the case of Italy where the measure is based on the CPI.
2. As an alternative test for the presence of significant gap level effects, we re-estimated the equations after replacing the lagged 
change in the level of unemployment with extra lags in the level of unemployment gap. After testing for whether the 
coefficients associated with the lagged gap variables were jointly significant (first row with P-values reported), we tested 
whether the sum of the coefficients associated with the lagged gaps was significantly different from zero (second row of the P- 
values). A rejection of the null hypothesis that the sum of coefficient is not significantly different from zero can be interpreted 




























































































Table 3. Test of asymmetric hysteresis
Effect on inflation of the unemployment gap and the change in the unemployment rate 
when periods of rising and falling unemployment are introduced separately 
(based on GDP deflato-)'
Japan Germany France United Italy
Sample 61H1-95H2 63H1-94H2 64H1-95H2 65H1-94H2 63H2-94H2 63H2-95H2
A ^,, -0.294 -0.416 -0.655 -0.893 -0.263 -0.350 
...(2-5).................. (3.3)............... (5.2)...................(6.9).................. (2.0).................. (2,9)
A 2P,,
-0.363 -0.531 -0.483 -0.108 -0.272 
........... ' ................. (3,®............... (3,5)...................(3,0).................. (0,9)...............  (2.3)
A
-0.205 -0.470 -0.203 -0.223 -0.242 
........... ' ................. (17)............... (3.0).................. (1,5).................. (1.8).................. (2.1)
A 2P,,
-0.424






........... ' .........................' ............... (I,?)........................... :........................
GAPPOS,, -0.456 -0.835 -0.518 -0.581 -0.383 -0.031 (2.3) (0.4) (1.4) (1.2) (1.1) (0.0)
AUPOS,., -0.788 -12.6 -1.763 -2.912 -3.357 -1.557 (2.1) (2.1) (1.4) (1.9) (3.0) (0.8)
AUPOS,j 3.786(2.1)
AUPOS^ -2.74 i (2.0)
GAPNEG,, -0.214 -2.88 -0.047 1.604 -0.396 -0.102
...0 ,3 ).................. ( I D ............... (0,1).................. (2.1) ..... (1-0).....  (0.1)
AUNEG,., -0.163 -0.216 -0.154 4.363 1.129 -5.703 
....(9,3).................. (0.1)............... (0,1) (1.2) (0.7) (2.1)
a u n e g ,.2 -0.979(0.4)
AUNEG, j -3.473(1.6)
ADJ-R2 0.213 0.249 0.320 0.465 0.134 0.235




























































































Table 4. Test of asymmetry under the assumption of hysteresis
Effect of positive and negative unemployment changes on inflation 




Sample 63H1-94H2 64H1-95H2 63H2-94H2 63H2-95H2
A2/5,, -0.380 -0.717 -0.095 -0.349
(3.1) (5.6) (0.7) ..... (3,0)...............
-0.327 -0.609 -0.030 -0.272
(2.8) (4.3) (0.2) (2.4)................
a2/*,.,
-0.146 -0.508 -0.317 -0.242
(1.3) (3.4) (2.6) (2.1)
A 2Pri
-0.419












































ADJ-R2 0.201 0.385 0.335 0.170
__________ Statistical tests on the coefficients of lagged unemployment changes
HOl coefricients on AUPQS, , are jointly significantly different from zero
................. HO;...coefficients on AUNEG.^ye jointly significantly different from zero
P-vaiue ] 0.977 0.025 oloios' 6.025
fro?1 zero
P-value............. I ’ o.009 0.312 a005 0.403
HO: sum of coefficients on AUNEG,, is significantly different from zero 
P-value_______ ; 0.928_________ 6 005 a 9 5 3 6. 025





























































































Test of hysteresis under the assumption of symmetry
1. The empirical tests conducted to detect the relative importance of speed-
limit or hysteresis effects in the six largest OECD (Table 2) countries are based 
on the estimation of the following reduced-form relation between inflation and 
unemployment:
* /
A2p, = X j3' A2p ,_, + XUGAPt_, + X « , At/,.,
i = I «=1
[A.l]
where A2 p, is the change in inflation; UGAP = U-SRU where U is the observed 
unemployment rate; SRU is an estimate of the structural rate of unemployment 
and AU is the change in the actual unemployment rate. In theory, the finding 
that only the coefficients on the lagged changes in unemployment are 
significant is consistent with an hysteresis interpretation, given that in such 
cases, a permanent reduction in the inflation rate is obtained at the cost of a 
permanently higher unemployment rate.
2. There are many problems with the estimation of equation [1], the most 
important being the identification of the structural rate of unemployment 
(SRU)l. Given the uncertainties surrounding any estimate of the SRU, different 
approaches have been used in practice. For the results presented in Table 2 and
3, the measure of SRU was derived from the application of the Hodrick-Prescott 
(H-P) filter on the observed unemployment rate with a value of the smoothing 
parameter chosen in a way to produce a fairly smooth series of the 
unemployment rate. However, given the arbitrary nature of this approach, we 
have examined the sensitivity of the results to various smoothing parameters as 
well as to the case where the SRU is treated as a constant. Moreover, we have
1. Conceptually, the structural rate of unemployment (long-term equilibrium rate) should be 
the one used rather than the NAIRU to measure the gap in order to identify properly speed- 
limit effects. The reason is that in the presence of speed-limit effects, the NAIRU depends on 
lagged unemployment and, as a result, if the latter was used to measure the gap in A. 1, the 
finding that coefficients on lagged AU are insignificant would not necessarily imply the 
absence of speed limit. Moreover, given the reduced form of the equation estimated, it is 
empirically difficult to measure with great confidence the relative importance of lagged effects 




























































































examined the robustness of the method to the choice of the sample period^, the 
variable used to measure inflation, and to the specification of the dynamic 
structure of the inflation terms included in the estimated equation^. While the 
results of these tests are not reproduced, they essentially confirm the 
conclusions obtained on the basis of the tests reported in Table 2.
3. In addition, an alternative specification of the proposed equation where 
unemployment is replaced by the output gap and the change in output has been 
estimated^ The corresponding results are reproduced in Table A. 1. They 
indicate that, except for Germany and Japan, the coefficient on output gap is 
significant in all countries with a confidence level above 90 per cent. The 
hysteresis hypothesis, which could not be rejected in the case of Japan, 
Germany, Italy and the United Kingdom on the basis of the equation linking 
inflation to the unemployment gap (Table 2), is rejected in the latter two cases 
when the unemployment gap is replaced by the output gap in the inflation 
equation^.
Test of asymmetric hysteresis
4. In this case, we examine the possibility that some countries may be 
characterised by some form of asymmetric hysteresis, i.e. that the hysteresis 
mechanism is stronger in the case of a rise in unemployment than in the case of 
a fall. The results of this test, which are reproduced in Table 3, are also based on 
an equation of the form similar to A. 1. However, in order to test for possible 
asymmetry, the positive and negative changes in unemployment are introduced 2345
2. For example, in the cases of Germany and Italy, the equations have been re-estimated on a 
sample ending in 1990 to ensure that the results are not significantly affected by German 
reunification or the end of the “scala mobile” policy, respectively.
3. For instance, inflation has been measured based on private sector wages (including social 
contributions) rather than on the basis of the GDP deflator or consumer prices. Moreover, the 
constraint of inflation homogeneity in equation A .l. has been relaxed (i.e. inflation has been 
introduced in level rather than first-difference form, with no constraints imposed on the sum 
of lagged inflation terms on the RHS of the equation). Overall, these various changes have not 
led to significant changes in the results.
4. In this case, the specification of the inflation equation is identical to the one above except 
that the unemployment gap ( UGAP) and first-difference (AC/) are replaced by the output gap 
( YGAP) and first-difference ( A Y ).
5. It should be mentioned that in the case of Japan, little evidence can be drawn given the 
poor statistical performance of the equation as illustrated by the fact that output is significant 
in neither level nor first-difference form. On the other hand, when the output gap is measured 
based on a more volatile trend series, (small value of X parameter in H-P filter) we find a 




























































































separately ( AUPOS and MJNEG respectively). Moreover, the values of the 
unemployment gap which coincide with the periods of positive and negative 
changes in unemployment have also been introduced separately (GAPPOS and 
GAPNEG )6.
5. We can then verify whether the unemployment gap and/or first- 
difference effects are significant both in the case of a rise and a fall in 
unemployment. Overall, the results shown in Table 3 indicate that in the four 
countries where hysteresis could not be rejected on the basis of the test reported 
in Table 1 (Japan, Germany, United Kingdom and Italy), introducing separately 
the episodes of increases and decreases in unemployment does not lead to the 
finding of a significant gap level effect^. Moreover, in three of these cases 
(Japan, Germany and the United Kingdom), we observe that the effect of a rise 
in unemployment on inflation appears to dominate the effect of a fall, whereas 
the opposite is true in the case of Italy.
6. In the case of the United States, although a significant gap effect is 
found, it does not seem to be symmetric. It appears, in fact, that an increase in 
unemployment has an impact on inflation that is larger than that of an 
equivalent decline (given the state of excess demand or supply which prevails 
on the labour market during the respective periods of rising and falling 
unemployment). This type of asymmetric effect would thus be counter- 
intuitiveS
7. Finally, we find that in the case of France, the unemployment gap 
coefficient is singificant only when unemployment is falling whereas only the 
change in unemployment is significant when it is rising. France is thus the only 
case showing some evidence consistent with this type of asymmetric hysteresis, 
i.e. where the hysteresis assumption applies when unemployment is rising and 
where the conventional NAIRU model fits better when unemployment is 
declining.
6. It should be made clear that GAPPOS and GAPNEG do not necessarily represent positive 
and negative values o f the unemployment gap respectively, but rather the actual values of the 
gap during periods o f rising and falling unemployment.
7. The main results reported in Table 3 are not qualitatively sensitive to different measures of 
the gap based on various choices for the smoothing parameter of the H-P filter.
8. In the U.S. case, we have verified whether the results were sensitive to the introduction of 
dummy variables for the wage and price control measures during the Nixon era as well as for 





























































































Test of asymmetry under the assumption of hysteresis
8. Finally, in the four countries where the hysteresis assumption could not 
be rejected based on the previous tests, we examine whether the effect of a 
change in unemployment is symmetric. In order to do so, an equation of a form 
similar to A.l was estimated, witn the gap variables omitted and with the 
positive and negative changes introduced separately ( AUPOS et AUNEG).
9. The results shown in Table 4 are consistent with the presence of 
asymmetric effects of changes in unemployment on inflation^. However, the 
nature of the asymmetry observed differs across the countries. In the case of 
Germany and Italy, the negative changes in unemployment have a stronger 
effect on inflation whereas in the Japan and the United Kingdom, the positive 
changes appear to be dominant. In the first two cases, the increase in inflation 
associated with the decline in unemployment is more pronounced than the fall 
caused by a rise in unemployment which corresponds to the type of asymmetry 
usually expected.
9. Given the inclusion of several lags in the positive and negative changes in unemployment, 
some tests were made to verify first, whether the coefficients associated to these lags were 
jointly significant (first two rows of P-values) and, second, whether the sum of coefficients is 
significant (last two rows of P-values). A P-value equal to 0.05 indicate a rejection o f the null 
hypothesis with a 95 per cent confidence level. Since there is only one lag in the case of Italy, 




























































































Table A .l. Test of hysteresis under the assumption of symmetry
Impact of the output gap and the change in output on inflation 
(based on GDP deflator)1
United
States Japan Germany France
United
Kingdom Italy




































A 2P,, - -
-0.152
...... (10).............. - - -
A'P,* - -
-0.268







































Wald test on the joint significance of lagged YGAP parameters 
HO: UGAP coefficients are not significantly different from zero1.
P-value 0.001 0.111 0.142 0.007 0.015 0.000
Wald test on the significance of the sum of YGAP parameters 
HO: sum of lagged YGAP coefficients is not significantly different from zero.
P-value ! 0.002 0.249 0.188 0.008 0.007 0.015
1 Except in the case of Italy where the measure is based on the CPI.
2. As an alternative test for the presence of significant gap level effects, we re-estimated the equations after replacing the lagged 
change in the level of output with extra lags in the level of output gap. After testing for whether the coefficients associated 
with the lagged gap variables were jointly significant (first row with P-values reported), we tested whether the sum of the 
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